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Abstract 
Normative data on Remote Associate Test (RAT) problems is lacking for problems 
solved via semantic association rather than through the formation of compound words. The 
present study fills this void by collecting normative data on a variety of RAT problem types in 
terms of solvability, response time, and correlations between solvability and lexical 
characteristics. Analyses revealed variability in problem solvability, with association problems 
being solved significantly more than mixed types, and compound problems solved by the least 
number of subjects. Furthermore, this project used subsequent memory tests to examine the 
effect that solving a problem has on one's ability to remember the content later.  During free 
recall testing, subjects remembered significantly more words from problems they had 
successfully solved than problems they had failed to solve.  The implications of our results for 
understanding factors that influence problem solving and subsequent memory for problems are 
discussed.  
Keywords:  problem solving, memory, remote associates, normative data  
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Problem Solving and Memory:   
Investigating the Solvability and Memorability of Remote Associates Problems 
 People are constantly confronted with problems in daily life.  During the course of a 
single morning, one might have to locate lost car keys, figure out why the garage door will not 
open, and determine the fastest route around construction, all before facing new problems at 
work.  Problems vary in difficulty and importance, in how well they are defined and how they 
are presented, but they are an unavoidable part of life.  A problem can be defined as a question 
for which the answer is not readily obvious (Lovett, 2002), or a goal that is not immediately 
attainable (Hambrick & Engle, 2003).  Greeno (1978) has suggested three basic groupings to 
classify types of problems.  The first type includes problems of inducing structure, in which 
people must determine relations or patterns between items.  Another type is problems of 
arrangement, where people must arrange given components in a specific fashion to solve the 
problem.  Finally, there are problems of transformation, which require people to execute a 
certain sequence of transformations to achieve the end goal.  These categories illustrate the 
diversity of problem types people encounter and solve. 
Problem Solving 
Despite the frequency in which people encounter problems in need of solving, problem 
solving itself is considered a complex function which remains relatively poorly understood.  
Problem solving is a higher-order cognitive process that requires executive control and 
integration of more basic skills (Goldstein & Levin, 1987) and is an extraordinarily broad 
domain, which has been defined in numerous ways.  However, simply stated, it can be 
considered as the analysis and transformation of information toward a specific goal (Lovett, 
2002).     
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Just as problems themselves vary greatly in type, there are also countless approaches to 
studying problem solving.  In the early 20th century, Gestalt psychologists began studying 
problem solving by focusing on the solver’s cognition and perception of the problem (Lovett, 
2002).  When given a goal-oriented problem, there are two ways in which one might respond.  If 
the solver readily produces the behavior required to solve the problem, it is considered 
reproductive thinking, based on past experience or knowledge (Dominowski & Dallob, 1995).  
Productive thinking, on the other hand, occurs when previous experience proves insufficient to 
solve the problem, and a new strategy is required.  The latter category is often argued to involve 
insight—sudden comprehension of the solution—and was a major focus of Gestaltists 
(Dominowski & Dallob, 1995).  In the 1950’s, psychologists including Newell, Shaw, and Simon 
(1958) revived problem solving research, examining it using computer programs and a metaphor 
of the mind as an information-processing system.  In the 1980’s, the role of learning processes in 
problem solving became a major research focus, with emphasis on comparisons between experts 
and novices (Lovett, 2002). 
Research has unearthed many issues that affect problem solving ability, including 
motivation, creativity, emotion, environment, time of day, intellectual ability, fixation, 
comprehension, language parsing, expertise, and memory, to name a few (e.g., Dominowski & 
Dallob, 1995; Kostovsky, 2003; Lovett, 2002; Wieth & Zacks, 2011).  The present study focuses 
specifically on the relation between problem solving and memory.  Some psychologists theorize 
that problem solving is simply a type of remembering, claiming that memory retrieval is the 
main function underlying successful problem solving (e.g., Weisberg & Alba, 1981).  In contrast, 
emphasizing the distinction between memory and problem solving lies at the heart of many 
theories, including the idea of insight (Dominowski & Dallob, 1995).  Metcalfe (1986) noted that 
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people can predict quite accurately whether or not they will eventually remember an item. She 
devised an experiment to compare this feature of memory with problem solving, hypothesizing 
that if problem solving was indeed the same as remembering, then people would, after a short 
exposure to a problem, be able to predict their future problem-solving success.  However, the 
data were not consistent with this hypothesis, as subjects were unable to predict problem 
solvability.       
Working Memory 
While it is necessary to recognize problem solving and memory as separate domains of 
cognition, it is also important to note that the two are related and influence each other in many 
ways.  Memory is often separated into two stores or systems in psychology—long-term and 
short-term.  Information is either retrieved from a still active short-term memory, or a more-or-
less inactive long-term memory (Dominowski & Dallob, 1995).  Baddeley and Hitch (1974) 
replaced the concept of “short-term memory” with “working memory” to better represent 
memory’s role in active consciousness (Schwartz, 2011).  Working memory has emerged as a 
major research area in cognitive psychology, and while knowledge on the topic is growing, we 
still know relatively little about the true role of working memory in problem solving (Hambrick 
& Engle, 2003). 
 However, research has shown that working memory does play a role in many basic 
abilities germane to problem solving, such as comprehension of word order or high-imagery 
sentences (Baddeley, Elridge, & Lewis, 1981; Glass, Eddy, & Schwanenflugel, 1980).  
Comprehension is necessary for problem solving ability in that one must completely understand 
the instructions and what is being asked, and also that problems often require solvers to 
comprehend the larger meaning of a set of events or words.  Furthermore, working memory 
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capacity, which is responsible for bringing representations into focus and maintaining 
accessibility to these representations, is crucial for sustaining focused attention to a problem, 
suppressing unnecessary memory items, and avoiding problem-solving obstacles like functional 
fixedness (Hambrick & Engle, 2003; Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Horn & Masunaga, 2000).   
Long Term Memory 
 Investigations into long term memory (LTM) have also proliferated within psychological 
research in recent decades.  Long-term memory (LTM) is an unlimited capacity store capable of 
holding information over long periods (Weiten, 2007).  Information moves from working 
memory to LTM through a process involving rehearsal, semantic association, and depth of 
processing (Schulman, 1975).  While verbal working memory is based mostly on phonological 
encoding, LTM involves deeper semantic encoding, based on word meanings, rather than just 
perceptual codes (Weiten, 2007).   
For this reason, many theories of verbal LTM organization are rooted in semantics.  
Bousfield (1953) found that people automatically organize items into storage categories based on 
meaning, a concept known as clustering.  More complex knowledge may be further classified via 
multilevel conceptual hierarchies.  Likewise, schemas—clusters of knowledge on a particular 
object based on previous experience—also influence organization of memory (Koriat, 
Goldsmith, & Panksy, 2000).  A great deal of knowledge cannot be neatly organized into 
schemas or hierarchies.  To explain LTM organization of this knowledge, Collins and Loftus 
(1975) proposed semantic networks made up of nodes representing words or concepts, with 
pathways of varying lengths linking associated ideas.     
Common methods of assessing and measuring LTM include free recall and recognition.  
In a free recall task, the person must generate the target word from memory based only on 
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instructions or global cues.  On the other hand, verbal recognition tasks present the subject with 
words, and the subject must identify the target memory (Schwartz, 2011).  Both of these 
measures involve retrieval of information from the LTM.  Collins and Loftus’ semantic 
association network model describes retrieval as involving spreading activation (Collins & 
Loftus, 1975).  This means that when one word is activated in a person’s memory, their thoughts 
naturally go to related words.  Activation starts at the initial word, then spreads to other words 
(nodes) along the network’s pathways, meaning that closer, more semantically similar words are 
more likely to be activated than more distant words (Collins & Loftus, 1975). 
It is interesting to question why some ideas can be easily retrieved from LTM, while 
others cannot, and to examine factors affecting this retrieval.  For example, information which 
goes against an established schema may be more difficult to remember than information 
consistent with the schema (Koriat, Goldsmith, & Panksy, 2000).  Another important factor is 
incubation, a problem solving phase which provides time for conscious or subconscious 
recombination of information leading to progress toward retrieval of a solution (Seifert et al., 
1995).  Seifert and colleagues (1995) also emphasized the importance of impasses in problem 
solving and answer retrieval.  Impasses occur when a person cannot find a solution, and therefore 
stops working before arriving at an answer.  Seifert et al. (1995) suggested that problems 
resulting in impasses would leave failure indices in LTM, special memory traces which might 
guide later incubation or retrieval.   
Craik and Lockhart (1972) proposed a different idea as to why some items are 
remembered better than others.  Their idea was based on a memory framework referred to as 
“depth of processing”.  This conceptual framework goes beyond the multistore model of sensory 
memory, short term memory, and long term memory as distinct entities which information must 
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pass through sequentially.  In the depth of processing continuum, retention is a function of depth, 
and greater “depth” involves greater semantic or cognitive analysis.  Stimuli which are very 
meaningful, familiar, and compatible with existing cognitive structures will be processed to a 
deeper level and will be better retained than less meaningful concepts.  Craik and Lockhart 
(1972) explained that recognized stimuli may undergo “elaboration encoding” in which a 
recognized word triggers associated concepts, leading to further processing and enrichment.  
This analysis creates a memory trace, which becomes stronger and more persistent as analysis 
deepens.  These ideas may explain why certain stimuli are better encoded and retrieved during 
problem solving and memory tasks.  
Problem Solving and Memory 
Both depth of processing and verbal LTM are involved in the process of problem solving, 
making explorations of verbal problem solving and memory essential endeavors to further our 
understanding.  A useful task for investigating problem solving is the Remote Associates Test 
(RAT) developed by Mednick (1962).   Traditionally used to study creativity and insight in 
problem solving, the RAT has only recently appeared in studies involving memory (e.g. Storm, 
2011; Topolinski & Strack, 2008).  RAT problems each consist of a triad of cue words that are 
related to a common associate solution word (CA), either through semantic association, 
synonymy, or formation of a compound word.  These problems are referred to as “remote 
associates” because the three cue words do not need to be directly related to each other, but 
rather are linked by their association with the common fourth word.  In fact, the strongest 
associates to each cue word—the words that first come to mind—are often completely unrelated 
to the other cue words, adding to the difficulty of RAT problem solving (Storm, 2011).  
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RAT problems can be solved in a short period of time, are simpler than many other classic tests 
of insight, have concise single-word answers, and are physically compact for easy presentation 
(Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003b).  They provide a good measure of insight problem solving 
ability, and are also easily adapted to recall and recognition memory tests. 
Topolinski and Strack (2008) used the RAT to examine the influence of mindset and 
intention on intuitive judgment.  Although their experiment’s main focus was intuition, it also 
produced interesting results involving both problem solving and memory.  They found that when 
participants were uninformed of the underlying semantic structure of the triads and were 
instructed to simply read the words, the CA was automatically activated in a later lexical 
decision task.  However, when participants were instructed to memorize the triads, the CA was 
actually inhibited, meaning that this memorization impeded activation of the CA on the lexical 
task.  While the majority of the effects mentioned thus far demonstrate memory’s influence on 
problem solving, Topolinski and Strack’s findings also showed an influence of problem solving 
on memory.  In their experimental setup, a portion of triads shown to participants were 
“coherent”, consisting of words that could be remotely associated, while others were 
“incoherent”, meaning that no common associate actually existed.  During a subsequent recall 
task, words from coherent triads were better remembered than words from incoherent 
(unsolvable) triads.  The authors suggested that this effect might be caused by an underlying 
activation of the CA in coherent trials, which could facilitate retrieval of its associates.  
 Another recent study that has revealed information concerning problem solving’s 
influence on memory is Dougal and Schooler’s (2007) exploration of the discovery 
misattribution hypothesis.  This hypothesis suggests that the experience of successfully solving 
an insight problem can be confused with recognition memory (Dougal and Schooler, 2007).  For 
PROBLEM SOLVING AND MEMORY  10	  
the first part of Dougal and Schooler’s study, subjects were shown 60 words and instructed to 
memorize them.  Following the memorization, subjects were given anagrams to solve, and also 
asked to identify the word as old (from the memorized list) or new.  The results showed that 
successfully solved anagrams were more likely to be judged as “old” than unsolved anagrams, 
whether or not they had actually been on the memorized list.  An additional finding showed that 
solving anagrams instead of simply viewing words when judging recognition increased the 
proportion of words judged as “old”.  While Dougal and Schooler showed that problem solving 
can create false memories, Howe et al. (2010) found that false memories can prime problem 
solving.  Participants in this study were verbally presented with Deese/Roediger-McDermott 
lists, where words in each list were all associates of an unpresented critical lure.  Half of these 
critical lures were also answers to compound RAT problems.  After the DRM, subjects 
underwent a test of free recall, and then completed 8 RAT problems (4 of which had solutions in 
common with the critical lures).  It was discovered that when the critical lure had been falsely 
recalled, RAT problems were solved faster and more often.  In cases where the lure had not been 
falsely recalled, RAT solution rates and times were no different than the cases that had not been 
primed.  These results imply that false memories are capable of facilitating and priming problem 
solving. 
 Storm, Angello, and Bjork (2011) exposed participants to 60 word pairs, each consisting 
of one RAT cue word and one semantically associated word (e.g. playing-fun, credit-union).  
This cue-response training was followed by completion of the RAT problem solving task, and 
finally, a surprise recall test in which they were shown a cue word and instructed to recall the 
associated response.  Half of the words, “baseline pairs”, had not been seen during the RAT, 
while the remaining half, “fixation pairs,” had.  The results showed that RAT performance led to 
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the forgetting of the original associated pairs.  The problem-solving-induced forgetting occurred 
even when the participant had failed to solve the related problem, and when impossible RAT 
problems were administered (Storm et al., 2011).  
The Zeigarnik Effect 
Past research on the memorability of solved versus unsolved problems has yielded mixed 
results due to variations in methodology and stimuli (Patalano & Seifert, 1994).  A classic 
experiment by Zeigarnik (as cited in Patalano & Siefert, 1994) demonstrated that problems were 
more memorable when participants were interrupted by the experimenter and thus unable to 
solve them—a concept which has since become known as the “Zeigarnik effect.”  The Zeigarnik 
effect implies that interruptions during problem completion might lead to heightened memory 
access for these problems.  This improved retrieval ability would be beneficial, considering the 
usefulness of being able to quickly return to and reattempt unsolved problems (Patalano & 
Seifert, 1994).   
Attempts to replicate the Zeigarnik effect in various experiments have had limited 
success.  These mixed findings may be an outcome of differences in experimental setup, 
including problem solving time allotment, problem type, or processes used (Patalano & Seifert, 
1994).  However, Yaniv and Meyer (1987) found a similar effect in their investigation of the “tip 
of the tongue” experience, which occurs when a certain word cannot be recalled, despite a 
sensation of almost remembering.  Subjects were shown definitions of familiar yet infrequently 
used words, and asked to provide the word.  In a later test, faster lexical decisions were made for 
the unsuccessfully retrieved “tip-of-the tongue” words, suggesting elevated activation or 
availability of the unsolved problems.  Patalano and Seifert (1994) examined instances in which 
subjects themselves reached an impasse in problem solving, instead of being interrupted.  They 
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found that when most problems in a set were solved, unsolved problems were better recalled.  As 
they manipulated problem difficulty and set-size, they found that unsolved-problem 
memorability was significantly contingent on the ratio of solved to unsolved problems, while 
solved-problem memorability was not. 
The Generation Effect  
In contrast to the Zeigarnik effect, other studies have suggested an effect in which solved 
problems become fixed in the mind and are therefore more easily recalled (Bertsch, Pesta, 
Wiscott, & McDaniel, 2007; Patalano & Seifert 1994).  This “generation effect” refers to the 
finding in which subjects who generate information or answers are better able to remember it 
than subjects who simply read the information (Bertsch, et al., 2007).  Pachauri (1935) 
performed manipulations of Zeigarnik’s original experiment and discovered that in certain 
circumstances, subjects actually recalled completed tasks better than interrupted ones.  He 
suggested that completed problems become a whole entity, fixed in the mind, allowing for easier 
recall (Pachauri, 1935).  A number of other studies have demonstrated that well-understood, 
unambiguous situations, such as solved problems, are often easier to recall than incompletely 
understood problems (Bransford & Johnson, 1972; Dooling & Lachman, 1971; Patalano & 
Seifert, 1994).  Topolinski and Strack’s finding (2008) that words from coherent triads were 
better recalled than words from incoherent (unsolvable) triads could also be used in support of 
this phenomenon.  Additionally, Bartlett (1932) found that subjects were more likely to 
remember story details that conformed to a memory schema.  These findings suggest that a 
solved problem organized around a single, complete problem solving schema would be more 
memorable than an unsolved problem, not adhering to one set schema (Patalano & Seifert, 
1994). 
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Aims 
The present study extends previous work on RAT problem solving and memory by 
creating a set of solvability norms for previously un-normed problems, and examining the impact 
of problem solving on memory by testing if items from solved or unsolved problems are more 
easily remembered.  Like the Topolinski and Strack (2008) and Storm et al. (2011) studies, the 
present study uses RAT problems and subsequent tests of memory.  In 2003, Bowden and Jung-
Beeman developed and normed a set of 144 compound RAT problems.  However, the present 
study examines a wider variety of problem types, and the cue triads in the present study were 
associated with a common fourth word either by formation of compound words, semantic 
association, or a mixture of both. Prior to using these problems in investigations of memorability, 
it is important to understand the properties of the problems, the ease with which they can be 
solved, and individual difference variables that may affect how capable people are of solving 
them. 
 The first aim of this study was therefore to collect normative data on a 70-problem set.  
We anticipated that there would be variability in how easily problems were solved, indexed both 
by the time taken to solve a problem, and the number of people who were able to provide the 
correct solution. We also predicted that there would be differences in problem solvability due to 
differences in cue word and solution word characteristics, including association type, 
concreteness, familiarity, imageability, meaningfulness, and part of speech.  Normative data on 
these problems will provide solvability trends and data useful for selecting problems based on 
difficulty or response time for future studies.  
 The secondary aim of the present study was to examine subsequent memory for solved 
problems. We hypothesize that there will be differences in memorability of RAT problems based 
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on their solvability. We expect that RAT problems which are successfully solved will be better 
remembered on subsequent free recall and recognition tests than those left unsolved.  This could 
imply that solved problems involve more elaborate processing and spreading activation due to 
comprehension and answer generation, allowing for easier retrieval.  Plus, solving provides an 
additional association cue in memory that may enhance subsequent memorability. Alternatively, 
we might find that a Zeigarnik-like effect exists, where unsolved problems are better 
remembered than solved problems. 
Method	  
 
Participants 
 Seventy-six young adults between the ages of 18 and 21 participated in the study. Sixteen 
participants were excluded from analysis due to possible interfering health conditions or failure 
to meet study criteria. Specifically, subjects were excluded if they had psychological or 
psychiatric conditions that might affect attention or memory, or if they were taking medications 
known to affect cognition.  All participants were right-handed native English speakers. After 
exclusions, sixty subjects were included in the analysis (26 male, mean age =18.7, SD =.89). 
 All participants were part of the University of Michigan’s introductory psychology 
subject pool. Subjects gave informed consent to participate in the study, and received course 
credit for their participation. This study was approved by the University of Michigan Institutional 
Review Board.  
Materials 
Remote Associates Test: The Remote Associates Test (RAT) was programmed using 
ePrime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA).  Seventy word problems were taken 
from Craig (personal communication), McFarlin and Blascovich (1984), Smith and Blankenship 
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(1991), and Thompson (1993).  Each problem consisted of three cue words, which were related 
to one another through a fourth, solution word.  This solution word was related to each of the cue 
words either through semantic association (ex: fire and burn), formation of a compound word or 
phrase (ex: fire and hydrant), or contained cues that were related to the solution through a 
mixture of both compound words and semantic association.  Problems of each of these three 
types were selected from the papers mentioned, and care was taken to include each cue and 
solution word only once in the problem set.  The resulting RAT problem set consisted of 17 
association problems, 14 compound problems, and 39 mixed problems.  A list of these problems 
and their solutions can be found in Table 1. 
Recognition task stimuli: Forty-eight words were randomly selected from the 210 cue 
words that had been presented during the RAT (old words) and 48 words were randomly selected 
from a list of 92 words that had not been seen on the RAT (new words).  New words were taken 
from other RAT problems that were not included in this study (Craig, personal communication; 
McFarlin & Blascovich, 1984; Smith & Blankenship, 1991; Thompson, 1993) so as to keep 
characteristics of old and new words relatively similar.  All subjects were shown the same set of 
words, but in randomized order. 
Procedure  
RAT: Subjects were given instructions via computer before completing the actual task.  
This consisted of a description of problem format, information on ways in which the fourth word 
could be associated with the cues, and an example problem.  All participants were presented with 
the same set of 70 RAT problems, and problems were randomized to prevent any confounding 
primacy or recency effects during later memory tests.  Problems were presented on the screen 
one at a time.  The three cue words for each problem were presented in a column, with the order 
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of words in each problem also randomized.  Additionally, there were no repeated cue or solution 
words in the 70-problem set.  Each problem was shown for seven seconds, followed by 
presentation of a text box in which the participant could enter their solution.  There was no time 
limit for entering a solution once prompted with the text box, however once the text box 
appeared, the subject could no longer view the cue words for the problem.  If the participant 
thought of the solution before the seven-second timeframe ended, they were instructed to press 
the space bar as soon as they solved the problem and enter their solution when the text box 
appeared.  Response times were recorded for these cases. Furthermore, if the participant failed to 
come up with a solution word, they were allowed to leave the solution text box empty and skip to 
the next problem. 
Memory Tests: Directly following the RAT, memory tests were given to determine the 
relationship between problem solving and memorability.  Participants were not told about the 
memory tests before the RAT, and were not instructed to attempt memorization of words during 
problem solving. 
Participants first completed the free recall test, in which they were simply instructed to 
report as many words from the problem solving task as possible from memory.  Additionally, 
they were told to enter only as many words as they could remember, and not to guess.  
Participants entered words into a computer program one at a time, with no importance placed on 
word order and no time limit on the task. 
Following the free recall test, the recognition test was administered.  Old and new words 
were randomized and shown one at a time on the computer screen.  Each word was displayed for 
1200 milliseconds, and participants were instructed to decide whether or not the word was one 
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they had seen on the RAT.  Participants used the two mouse buttons to signify if the word was 
new or old.  
 Neuropsychological Tests: After completing the RAT problems and memory tests, 
participants completed a battery of neuropsychological tests to assess individual differences in 
memory span, problem-solving ability, and vocabulary, and their relationship to problem solving 
and memory performance.  First, participants completed Raven’s Progressive Matrices (Raven, 
1990) as a measure of fluid intelligence and non-verbal problem-solving ability.  Next, the 
WAIS-III Digit Span test (Wechsler, 1997) was administered to assess working memory 
capacity.  Finally, the Extended Range Vocabulary Test (Educational Testing Services, 1976) 
was completed as a measure of vocabulary knowledge.   
Subsequently, subjects completed questionnaires asking about strategies used, 
demographics and health history, and other factors that could affect testing performance.  The 
entire experimental session lasted approximately one hour. 
Results 
Norming Data 
 We calculated the percentage of participants who correctly solved each RAT problem, as 
well as the mean response time for each problem, including only cases in which the problem was 
correctly solved.  This normative data is provided in Table 1.  By averaging solution rates within 
each problem type, we found that association problems were correctly solved by 50.6% of 
participants, compound problems by 22.0% of participants, and mixed problems by 35.9% of 
participants.  A one-way ANOVA was used to test for differences between the mean percentages 
of participants solving problems of each of the three types.  Solving percentages differed 
significantly across the three problem types, F(2, 67) = 3.304, p < .05.  Independent samples t-
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tests revealed a significant difference between solution rates for association and compound 
problems t(29) = 2.699, p = .011.  A marginally significant difference between solution rates for 
compound and mixed problems was also found t(41.09) = -1.974, p = .055.  Mixed and 
association solution rates were not significantly different t(54) = 1.515, p = .136.   
Average response time for correctly solved problems was 4.2 seconds for association, 4.8 
for compound, and 4.4 for mixed.  One-way ANOVA yielded no significant differences in 
average accurate response time for the three problem types, F(2, 58) = 1.269, p = .29.  Graphs 
comparing the problem types in terms of percentages of participants solving the problems and 
average response times are shown in Figure 1. 
The number of subjects who correctly solved a problem was significantly negatively 
correlated with mean accurate response time (r = -.479, p < .001), meaning that the faster the 
average response time for a problem was, the more people solved it.  Looking at the relationship 
between these two variables within the different problem types, we found that accurate response 
time was significantly correlated with the number of participants who solved the problem for 
association (r = -.749, p = .001) and mixed types (r = -.373, p = .027), but not for compound 
types (r = .149, p = .661). 
Correlations between the number of times each problem was correctly solved, mean 
accurate response time for each problem, and a number of psycholinguistic and lexical variables 
were calculated.  Our aim was to examine various word properties and determine which 
significantly affect problem solvability and response time.  We wanted to ascertain what sort of 
cues led to faster, more accurate answers, and which solution words were more easily 
discovered.  Psycholinguistic and lexical characteristics for each of the problem cue words and 
solutions were generated through online databases.  Concreteness, familiarity, imageability, and 
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meaningfulness norms were taken from the MRC Psycholinguistic Database (Version 2.00).  
Data on word length (number of letters), number of phonemes, number of morphemes, number 
of syllables, part of speech, Kucera and Francis (KF) frequency norms, Hyperspace Analogue to 
Language (HAL) frequency norms, standardized mean lexical decision latency, proportion of 
accurate lexical decision responses, mean naming latency, and standardized mean naming 
latency for each word were taken from the English Lexicon Project (Balota et al., 2007). 
For one set of correlations, lexical data were averaged across the three cue words in each 
problem to create measures of average problem characteristics. Here, mean accurate response 
time was negatively correlated with the average number of phonemes (r = -.29, p = .024) and 
average number of morphemes in a problem (r = -.253, p = .049).  The shorter the words in the 
problem, the longer it took for participants to solve the problem.  When the data were broken 
down based on problem type, we found that this inverse relationship between response time and 
cue word length was only significant for mixed problems.  For mixed problems, mean accurate 
response time was negatively correlated with word length (r = -.431, p = .01), number of 
phonemes (r = -.483, p = .003), and number of syllables (r = -.356, p = .036).  Cue words from 
compound and association problems showed no significant correlations in this domain.  The fact 
that more mixed problems were included in testing than compound and association types may 
have led to this significance. 
We also computed these correlations using the properties of the solution words.  Here, the 
number of subjects correctly solving a problem was negatively correlated with standardized 
mean lexical decision latency (r = -.256, p =.033) and positively correlated with word 
imageability (r = .396, p =.001).  Again, correlations were also calculated based on problem type 
grouping.  For association problems, number of subjects who correctly solved a problem was 
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positively correlated with the solution word’s concreteness (r = .632, p = .009) and imageability 
(r = .846, p < .001).  Mean accurate response time for association problems was correlated 
negatively with concreteness (r = -.782, p = .001) and imageability (r = -.744, p = .002).  
Interestingly, compound solution words were correlated with completely different 
characteristics.  For compound problems, the number of subjects who correctly solved a problem 
was correlated positively with solution word frequency (r = .587, p = .027) and familiarity (r = 
.578, p = .038), and negatively correlated with standardized mean lexical decision latency (r = -
.754, p = .002).  Additionally, accurate response time for compound problems was negatively 
correlated with accurate lexical decision response (r = -.755, p = .007).  Solvability statistics for 
mixed problems were not significantly correlated with any solution word properties. 
Solvability and Memory 
 To examine the relation between problem solvability and memorability, we performed 
paired t-tests examining memory for correctly solved versus unsolved RAT problems.  First, we 
compared the number of recalled words from correctly solved problems to the number correctly 
recalled from unsolved problems.  A paired samples t-test was run using raw numbers of recall 
from solved and unsolved problems.  The analysis revealed that significantly more words had 
been recalled from correctly solved problems (M=9.7, SD=6.17) than from unsolved problems 
(M=7.13, SD=6.62); t(59) = 2.616, p = .011.   
However, since the number of RAT problems each participant correctly solved or did not 
solve was different, this meant there were different numbers of solved or unsolved problems the 
participant could possibly recall.  To account for this difference in set size, we divided the 
number of words each participant had recalled from correctly solved RAT problems by the total 
number of words from RAT problems they had correctly solved.  This created a percentage 
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which will from here on be referred to as a “scaled solved recall score”.  Likewise, we divided 
the number of words each participant had recalled from unsolved RAT problems by the total 
number of words from their unsolved RAT problems.  This is the “scaled unsolved recall score”.  
A paired samples t-test revealed a significant difference between the scaled solved recall score 
(M=12.8%, SD=7.3%) and scaled unsolved recall score (M=5.4%, SD=4.6%); t(59) = 8.486, p < 
.001.  (See Figure 2a for a graphical comparison.)  This shows that, accounting for set size, 
words from correctly solved RAT problems were still recalled significantly more often than 
words from unsolved RAT problems. 
 The calculations were more challenging for recognition.  While 210 cue words were 
shown during the RAT, only 48 of these “old words” were shown along with the 48 new words 
on the recognition task.  A paired samples t-test revealed a significant difference between the 
mean number of recognized words from correctly solved problems (M=12.53, SD=3.71) and the 
mean number of recognized words from unsolved words (M=20.52, SD=5.76); t(59) = -8.393, p 
< .001.  However, this difference is most likely due to the fact that participants failed to solve 
significantly more RAT problems than they successfully solved, meaning that there were more 
words from unsolved problems (M=133.2, SD=19.6) than words from correctly solved problems 
(M=76.8, SD=19.6) that could possibly be recognized; t(59) = -11.12, p < .001.  We calculated 
scaled solved recognition scores by dividing the number of recognized words from accurately 
solved problems by the total number of solved RAT words.  Scaled unsolved recognition scores 
were calculated by dividing the number of recognized words from unsolved problems by the 
total number of unsolved RAT words.  A paired samples t-test using these scaled scores revealed 
no significant differences between recognized correctly solved words (M=16.5%, SD=4%) and 
recognized unsolved words (M=15.5%, SD=4%); t(59) = 1.406, p = .165.  (See Figure 2b for 
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graphical comparison.)  While not significant, the mean in this case was greater for correctly 
solved words. 
Neuropsychological Tests 
 Neuropsychological correlation data can be found in Table 2.  RAT scores were 
significantly positively correlated with performance on Raven’s Progressive Matrices, the 
Extended Range Vocabulary Test, and Backward Digit Span.  This means that better RAT 
performance is associated with greater fluid intelligence, higher working memory capacity, and 
larger vocabulary knowledge.  In terms of memory for solved versus unsolved problems, 
performance on the Forward Digit Span test was negatively correlated with recall and 
recognition percentages for solved, but not unsolved words.  This actually suggests that subjects 
with lower short term memory capacities better recognize items from solved problems, although 
the backward digit span data did not support this idea.  ERVT performance was also negatively 
correlated with scaled solved recognition scores. 
Discussion 
Normative Study 
One goal of this study was to collect normative data on RAT problems of different types.  
We hypothesized that there would be variability in problem solvability, measured by accurate 
problem response times and number of participants able to correctly solve them.  While 
problems varied in terms of solvability rate and accurate response time, on average, association 
problems had significantly higher correct solution rates than mixed problems, and compound 
problems had the lowest solution rates.  Furthermore, association problems were solved fastest, 
followed by mixed and compound types, although this effect was not statistically significant.  
These patterns show that for this problem set, association problems were easiest to solve, and 
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compound ones were the most difficult, with mixed problem types falling in between.  These 
clear variations in accurate response time and number of participants correctly solving problems 
of different types uphold our hypothesis that solvability varies across problems. 
We also predicted differences in RAT problem solvability based on differences in 
problem word characteristics.  Analyses supported this prediction, revealing several correlations 
between lexical/psycholinguistic variables and the number of times a problem was solved.  High 
concreteness and imageability of the solution word was important for solving association 
problems quickly and accurately, while high frequency and familiarity proved important for 
solving compound problems, and solvability of mixed problems did not appear to be contingent 
on solution word characteristics.  When word variable data was averaged across the three 
problem cue words, mixed type problems were correctly solved faster when problems contained 
longer words in terms of number of letters, phonemes, and syllables.  For association and 
compound problem types, although certain solution word characteristics had a significant impact 
on the number of participants correctly solving problems, averaged cue word characteristics did 
not appear to play as significant a role.   
These results showed interesting differences in factors affecting solvability of association 
problems versus compound problems, suggesting differences in problem solving approaches 
utilized in solving these different types of RAT problems.  Imageability refers to the capacity of 
a word to evoke imagery or a mental picture, and concreteness is the extent to which a word 
refers to a physical object, material, or person (Paivio, Yuille, & Madigan, 1968).  Paivio (1971) 
proposed that these factors may affect perceptual threshold, percent correct, or reaction time 
measures of word recognition and knowledge.  The present study showed that physical 
concreteness and ability to picture a word were especially important in solving association type 
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problems.  This is consistent with the idea that imageability and concreteness both index 
referential meaning, the association between word and image.  On the other hand, this study 
showed that familiarity, or the rated frequency of word usage and exposure, is associated with 
accurate solution of compound word RAT problems.  Paivio (1971) explained familiarity as an 
index of representational meaning, or the availability of a verbal code for psychological 
processing.  It appears that the ability to mentally picture a solution object is more important for 
solving association problems, while compound problem solving ability is based more on the 
actual word and availability of its verbal code.  Solving strategies for association problems most 
likely involve visualizing solution possibilities related to the cue words, with less importance 
placed on the actual verbiage.  Strategies for compound problems would involve more emphasis 
on the physical solution word, its verbal code, and the participant’s familiarity with the word, 
rather than the mental imagery associated with it.  
There were few limitations to the norming component of this experiment.  However, a 
larger number of participants may have been beneficial to give our results more power.  Also, it 
may have been useful to include more pure association and compound problems.   
As mentioned earlier, RAT problems are commonly used to study creativity and problem 
solving.  They have also been used in explorations of success and failure, psychopathologies and 
emotion (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003b).  RAT problem usage is convenient in that they can 
be solved quickly, are physically compact, and easy to score.  By providing a list of problems 
and normative data, this study aims to encourage future usage of RAT problems in the 
aforementioned research areas, as well as novel areas, such as memory.  The solvability and 
response time data will make interpreting results easier in the future, and the new information on 
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solvability differences between association, compound, and mixed problem types may prove 
useful for comparisons and investigations of different types of problem solving.  
Solvability and Memorability 
 Another objective of this study was to examine memory of solved versus unsolved 
problems.  We hypothesized that successfully solved RAT problems would be better 
remembered on subsequent tests of free recall and recognition than problems which participants 
were not able to solve.  The data from the recall portion of our study supported this hypothesis.  
Correcting for set size of correctly solved and unsolved RAT problems, significantly more 
correctly solved than unsolved problems were recalled on average.  The design of the recognition 
task made interpretation of results more complicated. There was no significant difference 
between solved and unsolved problems in terms of scaled scores, although numerically more 
solved problems were recognized.  Comparing raw number of recognized words from solved and 
unsolved problems actually revealed a significantly higher number of recognized unsolved 
words.  However, this calculation is biased by the fact that participants left significantly more 
problems unsolved than they were able to correctly solve, meaning that there were many more 
unsolved words that could later be recognized.  Given the difficulty in interpreting recognition 
scores, we will focus our interpretation on the relationship between solvability and recall, as this 
was our most reliable measure. 
 Previous investigations into memorability of solved and unsolved problems have yielded 
mixed results due to differences in experimental setup, conditions, and method of problem 
solving testing.   However, many past studies have suggested or reported findings consistent with 
the results of our recall test.  A meta-analysis conducted in 2007 indicated a robust and 
consistent generation effect across the literature (Bertsch et al., 2007).  The project analyzed the 
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results of over 86 studies including more than 17,000 subjects, and using methodologies of 
various types and difficulties.  Results revealed a .40 standard deviation advantage in subsequent 
memory performance for information that had been generated or solved, rather than simply read.  
Although not specifically examining solved versus unsolved problem memory, the finding of the 
generation effect is relevant to the study at hand since solving a problem involves actively 
generating information, while failing to solve it typically involves less.  However, this generation 
effect applies specifically to recall of solved solution words.  High recall of solved cue words is 
more directly explained by the depth of processing achieved during solution generation, a 
concept which will be further addressed later. 
 Past literature has also demonstrated a positive relation between comprehension and later 
tests of memory (Bransford & Johnson, 1972; Dooling & Lachman, 1971).  Dooling et al. (1971) 
found that subjects understanding the theme of a phrase of passage performed better on word 
recognition tests, especially when the word was semantically associated with the theme.  This 
suggested the importance of understanding or discovering an overarching theme in a passage (or 
in the case of our RAT problems, between words) for subsequent recognition memory.  Bartlett 
(1932) also found that findings conforming to a memory schema or organized around a single 
complete idea were more likely to be remembered.  This is consistent with the present study in 
that participants who solved problems were likely able to mentally organize and associate the cue 
words with a single theme and solution word, and were therefore better able to remember the 
words than participants who were unsuccessful at producing the correct answer.  Pachauri (1935) 
found completed/solved problems to be more memorable than interrupted/unsolved problems, 
and posited that successfully completed problems become a whole entity, “fixed in the mind”, 
which allows for easier memory. 
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 More directly related is Topolinski and Strack’s finding that words from coherent word 
triads were recalled significantly more than words from incoherent triads (Topolinski & Strack, 
2008).  In their study, “incoherent” triads were sets of three unrelated words.  It was impossible 
for subjects to find a common associate or semantic link between the three.  These incoherent 
triads were unsolvable, and thus similar to the unsolved words in our study.  Our findings were 
consistent since both studies revealed poorer recall performance for unsolved/incoherent 
problems.  A likely explanation for why words from coherent triads/correctly solved problems 
were better recalled is that there is more spreading activation along semantic network pathways 
when participants are able to successfully link the cue and answer words together.  This is 
mainly true for association type problems, which may explain their higher solution rate as well.  
This process can be helpful for memory during both encoding and retrieval .   
 Craik and Lockhart (1972) related the process of spreading activation to a concept 
dubbed “elaboration coding”.  They explained that depth of processing is key for memory 
encoding and retrieval.  Words that are more deeply processed via elaboration, semantic 
association, and cognitive analysis will have a stronger memory trace, and will be more easily 
accessed during subsequent tests of memory (Craik & Lockhart, 1972).  The depth of processing 
model could explain why items from solved words were more likely to be recalled in our study.  
This would imply that solved problems are more deeply processed due to idea elaboration or 
associations formed during problem solving.  The process of solving creates a stronger trace for 
words from solved problems than words from unsolved problems, allowing for easier retrieval 
during the recall task. 
 While our recall results support the idea that correctly solved problems are more deeply 
processed, and therefore more easily recalled than unsolved problems, our recognition results 
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were complicated and limited due to experimental design.  Subjects were only exposed to a 
random sampling of 48 old RAT words during the recognition task, in addition to the 48 new 
words.  Comparing the raw, unscaled numbers of solved and unsolved recognition words would 
not be accurate.  In order to account for solved and unsolved RAT sample size during analyses, 
we divided the number of recognized words from solved and unsolved problems by the total 
number of words from solved and unsolved RAT problems, respectively.  However, since all of 
the RAT words were not shown on the recognition task, participants may have been exposed to a 
biased number of possible solved or unsolved words during recognition, so this measure is not 
100% accurate.  In order to test all of the RAT cue words on recognition, 210 old and 210 new 
words would have been required in the recognition task—an overwhelming number for 
participants.  However, as the primary purpose of this study was to obtain normative problem 
data, cutting down on problem number would not have been in the study’s best interest either.  
Future studies may find it beneficial to adjust the recognition task design to see if results more in 
line with those of the recall task are attained when more exact methods are used. 
 It may also be interesting to examine the relation between problem solvability and 
memorability in a more diverse group of participants, as this study was limited to young 
university students with high education levels.  A possible future direction could be to examine 
this relationship in participants of different ages, or to see if the same effect exists in clinical 
populations such as those dealing with cognitive impairment, schizotipia, or memory problems. 
Neuroimaging could be used to determine the brain regions activated during problem 
solving/encoding, and also retrieval of solved and unsolved items.  Insight problem solving is 
typically associated with right hemisphere activation (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003a), however 
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it could be interesting to investigate bihemisphere engagement due to aging, as well as any 
differences in memory for solved versus unsolved problems in older adults. 
 Furthermore, analysis of the neuropsychological tests revealed correlations between RAT 
problem solving performance and intelligence, vocabulary, and working memory capacity.  This 
demonstrates that verbal problem solving ability is generally related to other measures of 
cognitive ability.  In future studies, it would be interesting to further explore other factors such as 
creativity, reasoning, and attention to determine their relation to one’s ability to solve different 
types of RAT problems. 
 Overall, more research is needed to confirm and expand our findings.  Future 
investigations may have implications for current theories of memory and problem solving.  
Problem solving in the real world is a relatively poorly understood process at present, especially 
in terms of the relationship between problem solvability and memory.  Studying these concepts 
in the lab may lead to improvements in problem solving strategies which could be implemented 
in real world settings such as schools and workplaces.  Understanding the impact problem 
solving has on later memory may also lead to useful techniques for maintaining or improving 
memory. 
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Table 1 
 
Remote Associate Problems and Normative Data 
	  
Problem 
Type Cue Words Solutions 
% of 
Participants 
Accurately 
Solving 
Problem 
Mean 
Accurate 
Response 
Time (sec) SD 
Association slither-venomous-fangs Snake 100 2.87 1.44 
 bark-beware-kennel Dog 95 2.97 1.23 
 quack-pond-waddle Duck 95 3.18 1.51 
 pasteurized-cow-drink Milk 95 2.83 1.42 
 sheep-clip-sweater Wool 82 4.63 1.09 
 go-grass-irish Green 72 4.07 1.38 
 
twinkle-celebrity-
bethlehem Star 63 4.69 1.14 
 trip-asleep-autumn Fall 62 5 1.35 
 cough-flame-cigarette Smoke 57 4.23 1.59 
 scissors-incision-meat Cut 45 4.94 1.38 
 ebony-soot-pitch Black 35 4.04 1.25 
 food-butterflies-pump Stomach 22 3.99 1.06 
 bolt-loaf-squirrel Nut 20 5.71 1.28 
 colander-effort-stress Strain 12 5.38 1.68 
 leather-conceal-lair Hide 7 4.77   
 kitchen-prevent-duel Foil 0 0.00a   
 team-elected-nation Member 0 0.00a   
Compound surprise-line-birthday Party 62 5.39 1 
 swept-mill-blown Wind 43 4.39 1.44 
 brow-glass-level Eye 40 5.42 0.87 
 ship-outer-crawl Space 35 4.58 1.01 
 car-fog-french Horn 30 4.25 1.59 
 motion-poke-down Slow 22 4.3 2.03 
 soap-shoe-tissue Box 20 4.6 1.75 
 man-order-air Mail 18 4.66 1.06 
 wood-liquor-luck Hard 15 4.9 0.5 
 water-pen-soda Fountain 12 5.15 0.6 
 arm-coal-peach Pit 7 5.13 1.51 
 skunk-kings-boiled Cabbage 3 0.00b   
 key-wall-precious Stone 2 0.00b   
 type-ghost-story Writer 0 0.00a   
Mixed honey-swarm-sting Bee 97 3.11 1.5 
 curiosity-nap-whiskers Cat 92 3.38 1.36 
 shelf-read-worm Book 90 3.94 1.58 
 bride-reception-ring Wedding 88 3.25 1.18 
 dunes-castle-beach Sand 87 3.66 1.32 
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 love-felt-broken Heart 85 4.33 1.49 
 mouse-sharp-american Cheese 75 4.34 1.75 
 elderly-fashioned-timer Old 72 4.42 1.7 
 rose-blood-anger Red 68 3.84 1.47 
 chocolate-fortune-tin Cookie 67 4.68 1.52 
 sky-ocean-mood Blue 65 4.18 1.19 
 greeting-index-joker Card 62 4.3 1.54 
 bald-screech-emblem Eagle 48 4.42 1.39 
 candle-dawn-feather Light 45 5.1 0.99 
 athletes-paw-rabbit Foot 37 4.1 1.37 
 widow-bite-monkey Spider 37 4.51 1.14 
 cob-joke-pop Corn 33 5.28 0.97 
 bottom-spinning-table Top 30 4.5 1.35 
 daffodil-fever-caution Yellow 28 4.84 1.42 
 keel-show-row Boat 27 5.8 1.54 
 elephant-lapse-vivid Memory 25 4.52 1.3 
 volume-speaker-noise Loud 23 4.18 1.45 
 residence-sick-brew Home 20 4.61 0.95 
 stop-petty-sneak Thief 17 4.32 1.08 
 desert-ice-spell Dry 13 5.65 1.02 
 curry-tropics-stuff Hot 13 4.95 2.34 
 jam-drug-signal Traffic 13 6.26   
 bass-complex-sleep Deep 8 2.22   
 base-cricket-dance Ball 7 0.00b   
 
unbroken-gramophone-
tape Record 7 2.15   
 liver-church-recital Organ 5 0.00b   
 lick-sprinkle-mines Salt 5 4.47   
 jump-kill-bliss Joy 3 5.02   
 bell-iron-tender Bar 2 0.00b   
 hens-flashlight-artillery Battery 2 3.45   
 cherry-time-smell Blossom 2 0.00b   
 wash-cheap-truck Dirt 2 4.94   
 stalk-trainer-king Lion 2 6.97   
 slug-swell-misty Sea 2 5.98   
 
Note.  A mean accurate response time of 0 seconds for a problem signifies that either: aNo 
participants accurately solved the problem, or bparticipants accurately solved the problem, but 
only after the 7-second viewing time frame had passed. 
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Table 2 
Neuropsychological Data 
    Scaled  
Recall Score 
Scaled 
Recognition Score 
 RAT Score Recall Recognition Solved Unsolved Solved Unsolved 
Raven’s 
Progressive 
Matrices 
 
.382** -.143 -.123 -.088 -.240 -.220 -.015 
ERVT 
 
.467** .152 -.113 -.085 .195 -.256* -.037 
Digit Span 
Forward 
 
.231 -.110 -.026 -.263* .008 -.261* .082 
Digit Span 
Backward 
 
.288* .157 .142 -.067 .245 -.082 .168 
 
Note. Correlation values, r of participants’ neuropsychological test scores and RAT, recall, and 
recognition performance. **p < .01. *p < .05. 
RAT score refers to the total number of problems correctly solved, recall is the number of 
correctly recalled words, and recognition is the total number of “old words” correctly 
recognized.  Scaled recall scores were calculated by dividing the number of recalled words from 
correctly solved (or unsolved) words by the total number of words from solved (or unsolved) 
RAT problems.  Scaled recognition scores were calculated in the same manner. 
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Figure 1.  Comparisons between RAT problem types.  (a) Average percentage of participants 
correctly solving problems of each type.  (b)  Average response time for correctly solved 
problems of each type.
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Figure 2.  Measures comparing memorability of RAT words based on their solved status.   
(a) Scaled scores for recall of correctly solved and unsolved RAT words.  (b) Scaled scores for 
recognition of correctly solved and unsolved RAT words. 
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